A Dangerous Bend in an Ancient Road: The Use of Similar Fact Evidence for Corroboration

Recent Florida cases have ruled that similar fact evidence can be used to support a victim’s testimony in child molestation cases. However, this logic could lead to an expansion of the use of propensity evidence in other types of cases, which goes against general limitations. This could make the general limitation on the use of propensity evidence meaningless. It’s important to rethink these cases to avoid this outcome. Similar fact evidence is a type of evidence that shows a person’s past actions to prove that they are likely to have committed a crime. However, this type of evidence is usually not allowed in court because it is not legally relevant. It is considered weak logic to use past actions to predict future behavior, and it can lead to unfair decisions. To be admissible, similar fact evidence must be able to prove something other than just the person’s past actions. It must be relevant to a specific issue in the case, not just to show a person’s propensity to commit a crime. When deciding whether to use similar evidence in child molestation cases, courts have a hard time because it’s not always clear if the evidence is relevant or helpful. This is especially true in cases where the abuse happens within a family. Because of this, it’s rare for similar evidence to be allowed in these types of cases. Courts struggle with allowing similar fact evidence in sexual assault cases because it can be seen as proving a person’s propensity to commit the crime, rather than focusing on the evidence at hand. However, some courts have relaxed this standard in cases involving family members, allowing similar fact evidence to corroborate the victim’s testimony. There is still confusion about how to apply these rules in different cases. The cases of Rawls and Saffor in 1993 raised questions about what type of evidence could be used in court for molestation cases. The issue of whether similar fact evidence was properly admitted was debated, with the court trying to figure out if the evidence was strikingly similar and if it was relevant to the case. The court also had to decide if the evidence could be used to support the credibility of the victim’s testimony. The decisions in these cases showed the challenges in interpreting the rules for using similar fact evidence in court. The majority said that similar fact evidence was admissible because it showed a pattern of behavior, but the dissenting opinion said it was not similar enough to be relevant. Both Rawls and Saffor took the case to the Florida Supreme Court. In Rawls’ case, the court agreed with the district court that the evidence was admissible because it was relevant for corroboration. The court said that evidence of similar past behavior was not allowed in the Rawls case because it did not involve a family relationship, which was a requirement under a previous case called Huering. However, the court later realized that this restriction was not necessary and that evidence of similar past behavior could still be used to support the victim’s testimony. The court said that the evidence could be used as long as it was similar enough to the current case. In the case of Saffor, the Supreme Court had three different opinions. The majority said that the similar fact evidence couldn’t be used because the charged and similar offenses were not similar enough. Justice Anstead agreed with a different court’s opinion. Two other justices disagreed and said the similar fact evidence should be allowed. In simple terms, in cases of child molestation where the identity of the perpetrator is not in question, the court can consider evidence of similar acts to help prove the victim’s testimony. This evidence can be from other cases in the same family or authority figure relationship. The key factors are whether the defense is about identity or lying, and whether the acts are similar enough to be considered. The lower courts are still struggling to apply the principles from the Rawls and Saffor cases to specific situations. It’s difficult for them to use the standard because it’s very complicated. No court has answered a simple but important question: How does similar fact evidence support the victim’s testimony in any way other than showing a person’s tendency to behave a certain way?
But, the truth is, it doesn’t. The reasoning in these cases is flawed.
These cases caused a lot of conflicting opinions because their reasoning is flawed and doesn’t match the principles of §90.404. Similar fact evidence can only support a victim’s testimony by proving their tendency to act a certain way. To prove this, we need to go back to the basics, which is something that has been talked about a lot in these cases – the requirement for the evidence to be very similar. The law doesn’t allow using past crimes to show that someone has a tendency to commit certain crimes. There are rules about when this kind of evidence can be used in court. If the similarities between the past and current crimes are very obvious, then we don’t need to rely on the person’s tendency to commit crimes. We can just show that the past and current crimes are so similar that it’s reasonable to think the same person did both. But if the similarities are not as obvious, then we have to rely on the person’s tendency to commit the crime. It’s important to remember that the evidence of similar past crimes can only be used in certain situations and for specific reasons, and not just to show that someone has a tendency to commit crimes. Huering and others have not talked about how similar evidence is important in this situation. They believe that if a witness says the defendant did something similar to someone else, then it proves the defendant has a tendency to do that thing. This makes the victim’s claim more believable. But, this reasoning goes against the law. The similarity between the offenses is just a coincidence and doesn’t change the logic. This can be seen with other crimes as well. For example, if someone is accused of robbing a store, the only witness is the clerk. They identify the defendant and their credibility is important in proving the defendant’s guilt. In a trial, the state wants to use past similar crimes as evidence to prove the defendant is guilty. But the evidence doesn’t meet the requirement of being very similar, so it might not be allowed. If the victim’s identification of the defendant is questioned because of police procedures, the evidence might still not be allowed. If the defendant claims the victim made up the crime, the evidence might not be allowed. If a police officer says the defendant sold drugs, the state wants to use past similar drug sales as evidence. But if the officer has a grudge against the defendant or has memory problems, the evidence might not be allowed. The rules on whether this evidence can be used are the same in all these situations. According to Richard J. Sanders, evidence of similar crimes can be used in court to support the testimony of witnesses. This is because the fact that someone has committed a similar crime in the past makes it more likely they committed the crime they are currently being accused of. This is especially relevant in cases of molestation or sexual assault. However, some people disagree with this and think the logic is flawed. They believe the use of similar fact evidence should be reconsidered to ensure fair trials. This column is from the Criminal Law Section of a legal organization. It’s all about following the rules and serving the public, improving how the law is enforced, and learning more about legal principles.

Source: https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/a-dangerous-bend-in-an-ancient-road-the-use-of-similar-fact-evidence-for-corroboration/