IBP v. Alvarez

The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided that employees must be paid for the time they spend putting on and taking off protective gear at work. They also have to be paid for the time they spend walking to and from their work areas after changing into their gear. But there are still some questions about exactly what is covered by this decision. The Portal-to-Portal Act was passed in 1947 to define what activities are considered compensable work under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Act excludes activities like walking and traveling to and from work from being compensable, but it does not address compensation for activities between an employee’s first and last principal activities. In the 1956 case Steiner v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court ruled that employees should be compensated for time spent showering and changing into protective work clothes because these activities were essential for their main job of battery production. This decision clarified that activities integral and indispensable to the principal activity should be considered compensable work. The IBP v. Alvarez decision addressed whether employees should be paid for the time they spend putting on and taking off protective gear and walking to and from their work areas. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said they should be paid for putting on and taking off unique gear, and for walking, but not for nonunique gear. The First Circuit Court of Appeals said employees should be paid for putting on and taking off all required gear, but not for walking. The Supreme Court had to decide which activities were compensable under the law. The Supreme Court heard arguments from the companies and the employees about the meaning of the law, and what the Department of Labor had to say about the issue. The Supreme Court said that employees must be paid for the time they spend walking from their changing area to the production floor after putting on their specialized protective gear. They also have to be paid for the time they spend waiting to take off the gear. However, they don’t have to be paid for the time they spend waiting to put it on. The Court also said that the gear is considered an essential part of their job, so they have to be paid for the time spent dealing with it. Overall, the decision means that employees have to be paid for certain activities related to their work, but not others. The court was deciding if the time it takes workers to walk from the locker room to the production floor should be paid. It didn’t say if the same rule applies for putting on nonunique protective gear. The court’s decision seems to contradict itself because it said all protective gear is a principal activity, but then it said some of the time doesn’t have to be paid. It didn’t explain this contradiction. The continuous workday rule is unclear when it comes to figuring out if driving time between work-related activities should be paid. For example, should a sales person be paid for the time it takes to drive to the office after making a work-related phone call from home? This issue was brought up in a court case, and the decision is still not clear. Employers should be careful when deciding how to pay their employees for their work time. 1 IBP, 163 L. Ed. 2d at 305. 2 29 U.S.C. §254 (2005). 3 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). See also Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944); Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944). 4 61 Stat. 84. 5 29 U.S.C. §254 6 29 CFR §790.6(b) (2005). 7 Id. at 251. 8 Id. 9 Id. at 248-49. 10 Id. at 251-52. 11 Id. at 256. 12 Id. at 252-53 (citing the following legislative history: “In accordance with our intention as to the definition of ‘principal activity,’ if the employee could not perform his activity without putting on certain clothes, then the time used in changing into those clothes would be compensable as part of his principal activity.”). 13 IBP, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 298. 14 Id. 15 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25344 (D. Wash. 2001). 16 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 903. 17 See, e.g,, Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692 (“When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded. Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that compensable working time is involved.”); Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1984). 18 Alvarez, 339 F.3dat 904. 19 Id. 20 Id.at 907. 21 Id. at 906. 22 Tums, 360 F.3d at 279. 23 Id. at 282. 24 Id. 25 IBP, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 294. 26 A complete transcript of the oral argument can be accessed at www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.html 27 29 CFR §790.7, n. 49. 28 IBP, 168 L. Ed. 2d. at 302. 29 Id. at 305. 30 Id. at 300. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. at 302. 37 Id. at 304. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 305. 40 Id. at 300. 41 Id. at 299. 42 Id.

Source: https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/ibp-v-alvarez/